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Admission of Liability
Richard H. Burgess*
A CONTROVERSIAL QUESTION sometimes arises as to whether
or not to admit liability in a tort case. This is an extreme
tactic which must be carefully considered before being used.
The normally expected benefits include decreasing the length
and cost of the trial and the exclusion of inflammatory evidence
on the issue of liability.
A survey conducted among members of the International
Association of Insurance Counsel in 1955 showed that 85 per
cent of the attorneys replying had found the admission of liability
a successful tactic, especially in cases of aggravated or gross
negligence.'
There is a great amount of resistance to the admission of
liability when the slightest defense is available. Many defend-
ants' attorneys would prefer to take the long chance of hoping
for an unexpected verdict rather than admit fault and leave
only the issue of damages to the jury. Surprisingly, there have
actually been cases in which liability was admitted and the
jury returned a verdict of no cause of action.2 Generally speak-
ing, though, an admission of liability will tend to keep the dam-
age award reasonable, but it will take away the slight possibility
of an unexpected defendant's verdict.
Adjective Law
The subject of this article forms a part of the laws of evi-
dence, pleadings and trial practice.
The key question to be resolved is: Will the proposed ad-
mission cause the court to limit evidence to the dollar amount
of damages and exclude evidence on liability?
Once liability has been conclusively established by a judicial
admission of the defendant, either in the pleadings or in open
* B.S. in Nuclear Engineering, North Carolina State College; Third-year
student at Cleveland-Marshall Law School.
I Schlotthauer, Report of Practice and Procedure Committee, 1955, Admit-
ting Liability, 22 Ins. Counsel J. 326 (1955).
2 Kennedy, Admission of Liability-Strategic Advisability and Other Con-
siderations, Part I, With Particular Reference to Common Carriers, 22 Ins.
Counsel J. 306, 310 (1955).
Buchanan, Admission of Liability-Strategic Advisability and Other
Considerations, Part II, As to Defendant's Generally, and a Consideration of
Some of the Cases, 22 Ins. Counsel J. 316, 326 (1955).
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court, liability ceases to be an issue. Normally the major re-
maining issue is the extent of the plaintiff's damages.
Excluding inflammatory evidence on liability can often be
greatly to the defendant's advantage. A broken arm does not
cost the plaintiff more because the defendant was drunk when
he ran the plaintiff down with his car. However, a jury might
tend to give a larger verdict if they knew the defendant had
been driving under the influence of alcohol, or that he was
speeding on the wrong side of the street, etc.
A jury is more likely to give a plaintiff a substantial verdict
if the defendant was guilty of gross negligence and reckless dis-
regard for the safety of others than if the negligence merely
amounted to an error of judgment.3
Wigmore, in his set on evidence, treated the subject so
succinctly that a quote from that work covers the subject well.
A fact that is judicially admitted needs no evidence
from the party benefiting from the admission.
But his evidence, if he chooses to offer it, may even be
excluded; first, because it is now as immaterial to the issues
as though the pleadings had marked it out of the contro-
versy; next, because it may be superfluous and merely
cumber the trial; and furthermore, because the added
dramatic force which might sometimes be gained from the
examination of a witness to the fact (a force, indeed, which
the admission is often designed especially to obviate) is not
a thing which a party can be said to be always entitled to.
Nevertheless, a colorless admission by the opponent may
sometimes have the effect of depriving a party of the legiti-
mate moral force of his evidence; furthermore, a judicial
admission may be cleverly made with grudging limitations
or evasions or insinuations . . . so as to be technically but
not practically a waiver of proof. Hence, there should be no
absolute rule on the subject; and the trial Court's dis-
cretion should determine whether a particular admission
is so plenary as to render the first party's evidence wholly
needless under the circumstances. 4
The footnotes to this section of Wigmore indicate that the
rulings in the various jurisdictions are variant depending on
the facts. At the discretion of the court, evidence may be ad-
3 Martin v. Pacific Gas Co., 203 Cal. 291, P. 246 (1928).
4 9 Wigmore on Evidence 589, § 2591, 3d ed. (1940). Footnote 2 to this
section gives the then ruling cases in 18 states, the District of Columbia
and the Federal Courts.
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mitted or excluded on issues that have been settled by admis-
sions.
Various authorities support each view: first, that such evi-
dence should be excluded; 5 second, that the plaintiff should
not be deprived of his right to place all the facts before the
jury.6 Most of the cases seem to turn more on the facts than
on any concrete rule of law, although some are rather adamant
in their views, for example: Carter v. Ray, in which the court
said:
Evidence that is relevant cannot be kept from the jury by
a waiver of proof on that point or admission of fact, if the
party desires the testimony out.7
Both Corpus Juriss and American Jurisprudence9 express a
preference for the rule allowing the prolongation of a trial by al-
lowing evidence on issues already decided by admissions. Ac-
tually, though, the American Jurisprudence statement is con-
cerned mainly with criminal matters, and the Corpus Juris entry
does not take into account any of the modern cases, resting
mainly on the Dunning case of 1897.10 Corpus Juris Secundum
states,
A party is not required to accept a judicial admission of
his adversary, but may insist on proving the fact.1
The more modern view is expressed in the Barton case 1 2 and
in Rule 16 of the 1950 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which
states:
In any action, the court may, in its discretion, direct
the attorneys for the parties to appear before it for a con-
ference to consider ...
5 San Diego Land and Town Co. v. Neale, 78 Cal. 63, 20 P. 372 (1888);
Jenkins v. Hollingsworth and Tabor, 83 Ill. App. 139, 141 (1898); Hanskett
v. Broughton, 157 Minn. 83, 195 N. W. 794 (1923); Kurn v. Counts, 247 Ala.
129, 22 So. 2d 725 (1945); Fuentes v. Tucker, 31 Cal. 2d 1, 187 P. 2d 752
(1947); Carrigan v. State, 206 Ga. 707, 58 S. E. 2d 407 (1950); La Fon v.
Continental Casualty Co., 24 Mo. App. 802, 259 S. W. 2d 425 (1953).
6 Dunning v. Maine Central Railway, 91 Me. 87, 34 Atl. 352, 64 Am. St. Rep.
208 (1897); Martin v. Pacific Gas Co., supra, n. 3; Rupple v. Clayes, 230
Mo. App. 699, 72 S. W. 2d 833 (1934); Hawkins v. Gray Metal Products,
Inc., 309 N. Y. 919, 131 N. E. 2d 914 (1955).
7 Carter v. Ray, 70 Ga. App. 419, 28 S. E. 2d 361 (1943).
8 64 C. J. Trial § 116-D.
9 53 Am. Jur. 93 Trial § 105.
10 Dunning v. Maine Central Railway, supra, n. 6.
11 31 C. J. 2d 1068, Evidence § 299.
12 Barton v. Miami Transit Co. (Fla. Sup. Ct.), 42 S. 2d 849 (1949).
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(3) The possibility of obtaining admissions of fact and
of documents which will avoid unnecessary proof . . . The
court shall make an order which . . . limits the issue for
trial to those not disposed of by admissions or agreements
of counsel; ...
Both the Barton case and Rule 16 illustrate a trend towards
more efficiency in the courts. More recognition is being given
these days to the fact that a large backlog of cases with as much
as several years waiting time for trial can be a source of much
injustice. Speeding up cases by the use of pre-trial proceedings
and the exclusion of evidence on points not in issue can help
clear the dockets.
The cases need to be divided into two classifications for
analysis. Different procedure is called for in each of the follow-
ing:
1. Death actions.
2. Personal injury actions.
In death cases the damages are not affected by such things
as the force of impact in an automobile collision. On the other
hand, in a personal injury case the force of an impact may have
considerable bearing on the damages suffered by the plaintiff
in the form of shock and injuries, the extent of which is not
readily ascertainable, such as internal or back injuries. When
the fact situations are clear cut and the admissions of liability
are unambiguous the cases are rather uniform in death actions
and in personal injury actions.
In death actions admissions of liability can generally ex-
clude most of the evidence on the events causing the death.13
In personal injury actions admission of liability generally
will not exclude evidence pertaining to the seriousness of the
collision, etc.14
In one case involving both personal injury and death actions
the court ruled that evidence of the force of the impact could
be considered in determining damages in the personal injury
action, but not in the death action.
15
One of the greatest dangers in admitting liability is that the
plaintiff might amend his pleadings to include an allegation of
willful and wanton misconduct and a request for punitive dam-
ages. This puts a new cause of action into the pleadings and
13 Anderson v. Lavelle, 285 Mich. 194 (1938).
14 Schroth v. Philadelphia Rapid Transit Co., 280 Pa. 36, 124 Atl. 279 (1924).
15 Sumrall v. Butler, 102 Cal. App. 515, 227 P. 2d 881 (1951).
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should allow the defendant to obtain a continuance to revise
his defense, perhaps withdrawing the admission of liability.1"
A withdrawn judicial admission is treated as regular evidence,
i.e. it must be introduced, and it is not conclusive.17
It is generally recognized that a court has the power to set
aside an unsatisfactory verdict and limit a new trial to the issue
of damages only.'
Several law review articles have been written in the last
few years on the subject of judicial admissions, 9 and the author
is indebted to those sources.
Strategy
As noted in the previous section, the value of admitting
liability lies mainly in keeping evidence of the sordid details
of the accident from being considered by the jury in determining
damages. Therefore, liability should never be admitted until
an understanding is reached with the presiding judge that such
evidence will be excluded from the trial.
The popularity of admissions seems to vary significantly
on a geographical basis. In some states, notably the more rural
states, admission of liability is practically unheard of, whereas
in large urban areas it is used with caution by many attorneys.2 0
This reflects the attitudes of both the local judges and juries.
Where a court calendar is not too crowded an admission is
sometimes viewed as a confession of guilt or "asking for it."
More than any other factor, an attorney needs to know the
attitude of the local court before admitting liability.
The timing of an admission is quite important. Depending
on the case, an admission in the answer could either facilitate
a realistic settlement or give the plaintiff much more time to
concentrate on preparing for the proof of damages. Proving the
facts of an automobile accident, for instance, can be quite in-
volved. If the plaintiff doesn't have to prove fault he can have
much more time to concentrate on the damages.
16 Horsley, Admission of Liability in Tort Cases, 5 Defense L. J. 105 (1959);
Kennedy, supra, n. 2 at 311; 1 Trial Briefs 27 (Ill. St. Bar Ass'n) Snyder,
ed. Waukegan, Ill.
17 McCormick on Evidence 513, § 242 (1954).
18 Paul Harris Furniture Co. v. Morse et al., 10 Ill. 2d 28, 139 N. E. 2d 275
(1957); Barrow v. Lence, 17 Ill. App. 2d 527, 151 N. E. 2d 120 (1958); Barry
v. Keller, 1947 (Mass.), 76 N. E. 2d 158.
19 Harper, Admissions of Party Opponents, 8 Mercer L. Rev. 252 (1957);
Horsley, supra, n. 16; Kennedy, supra, n. 2; Buchanan, supra, n. 2; Schlot-
thauer, supra, n. 1.
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In addition, the longer one waits before admitting liability,
the more likely it is that new facts will turn up to take the
blame off the defendant.
Admissions can be made quite effectively in the pre-trial
proceeding or in the opening statement to the jury. When made
in the summation they generally have little beneficial effect. All
the evidence has already been presented to the jury and instruc-
tions to disregard part of the evidence made so late in the trial
would not wipe it from the jurors' minds. In addition the jury
might consider that the defendant never had a defense and took
their time for no good purpose.
When a multiplicity of suits arise out of one accident, it is
necessary to have a centralized co-ordination of the defense.
An admission of liability in one suit might prejudice the defend-
ant's position in another suit on the same accident. In such a
situation the co-ordinating attorney must weigh the chances
in all the cases before allowing an admission in any of them.
Conclusions
The admission of liability is a dangerous weapon to be used
only when there are no defenses. To use it is like abandoning
a faltering ship just before a storm. The ship will be lost but
perhaps more will be salvaged than if all stayed on board.
Liability is best admitted near the beginning of a trial be-
fore the opening statement of the plaintiff.
A knowledge of the attitude of the local courts is a prime
requisite of an admission of liability.
20 Kennedy, supra, n. 2.
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